NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Florida Power & Light Company
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389
License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16
EA 96-383

During an NRC inspection conducted on September 16 through 20, 1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (NUREG 1600), the violations are listed below:

A. 10 CFR 50.65 (b) establishes the scoping criteria for selection of safety related and non-safety related structures, systems, or components to be included within the Maintenance Rule program. Scoping criteria shall include safety-related structures, systems, or components that are relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure comparable to the 10 CFR, Part 100 guidelines; and non-safety related structures, systems, or components that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients or are used in the plant emergency operating procedures, or whose failure could prevent safety-related structures, systems, and components from fulfilling their safety-related function, or whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system.

St. Lucie Administrative Procedure, ADM-17.08, IMPLEMENTATION OF 10 CFR 50.65, THE MAINTENANCE RULE, Revision 7, implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65. Appendix B of ADM-17.08 identified those systems and components included within the scope of the rule.

Contrary to the above,

As of September 20, 1996, the licensee failed to include a number of systems and components within the scope of the rule as required. Specifically, the following systems and components should have been included within the scope of the rule but were not:

° Post Accident Sampling System - This non-safety related system was not included in Appendix B of ADM-17.08 even though it is provided to mitigate the consequences of accidents and is in the licensee's Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP-03, LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT & EOP-04, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE).

° Communications System - This non-safety related system was not included in Appendix B of ADM-17.08 even though it is relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients, and used during the performance of all Off-Normal and Emergency Operating Procedures.

ENCLOSURE 1

- Unit 1 Service Air System - This non-safety related system was not included in Appendix B of ADM-17.08 even though its failure could prevent safety-related systems or components from fulfilling their safety-related function. Failure of this system which was in use on July 13, 1996, would have resulted in the failure of the safety-related low pressure safety injection system operating in the shutdown cooling Mode to maintain reactor coolant system temperature within required limits.

- Main Steamline Radiation Monitors - These non-safety related radiation monitors for Units 1 and 2 were not included in Appendix B of ADM-17.08 even though they are used to mitigate accidents, and are used in Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP-04, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE) as an indication that a steam generator tube rupture has occurred.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I)

B. 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) requires, in part, that each holder of an operating license shall monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or components against licensee established goals. Such goals shall be established commensurate with safety.

Contrary to the above,

1. As of September 20, 1996, the licensee had failed to establish reliability goals or performance criteria commensurate with safety for risk significant structures, systems, or components for the following systems:

   - Chemical and Volume Control System
   - High Pressure Safety Injection System
   - Low Pressure Safety Injection System
   - Safety Injection Tanks
   - Main Steam System
   - Main Feedwater System
   - Auxiliary Feedwater System
   - Component Cooling Water System
   - Instrument Air System
   - Intermediate Cooling Water System
   - Reactor Protection System
   - Electrical Distribution System

   These systems had been modeled in the licensee's risk determining analysis, with a reliability goal of less than or equal to 2 maintenance preventable functional failures per 18 months. In establishing these goals, the licensee failed to demonstrate performance criteria were established commensurate with the critical assumptions used in the licensee's risk determinating

analysis. As such, the licensee's goals for reliability had not been established in a manner commensurate with safety.

2. As of September 20, 1996, the licensee had failed to establish adequate goals or performance criteria commensurate with safety for risk significant structures, systems, or components in that the condensate cross-tie valves between Unit 1 and Unit 2 which were designated as risk significant by the licensee, did not include availability goals, or reliability goals consistent with the critical assumptions used in the licensee's risk determining analysis.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1)

C. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) requires, in part, the holders of an operating license shall monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such structures, systems, and components, within the scope of the rule, are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. When the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) requires, in part, that monitoring as specified in paragraph (a)(1) is not required where it has been demonstrated that the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the structure, system, or component remains capable of performing its intended function.

St. Lucie Administrative Procedure, ADM-17.08, IMPLEMENTATION OF 10 CFR 50.65, THE MAINTENANCE RULE, Revision 7, established procedures for implementing of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) and (a)(2).

1. ADM-17.08, paragraph 7.8.4 requires that cause determinations shall consider any generic implications for structures, systems and components other than the one being evaluated.

2. ADM-17.08, paragraph 7.6.4 requires that performance monitoring be accomplished by tracking specific (SSC Level) and/or Plant Level Performance Criteria and repetitive maintenance preventable functional failures. Paragraph 7.11.2.A requires this information be reported in the licensee's Maintenance Rule Quarterly Reports.

3. ADM-17.08, paragraph 4.4.3 provides "System owners are responsible for monitoring systems, structures and components for compliance to performance criteria." Also, Appendix B of ADM-17.08 identified the Chemical and Volume Control and Containment Spray Systems as risk significant with specific availability performance criteria at the train level.

4. ADM-17.08, paragraph 4.4.4 provides "System owners are responsible for identifying potential maintenance preventable functional failures and bringing them to the attention of Management and the Maintenance Rule Administrator via the Condition Report Process."

Contrary to the above, as of September 18, 1996, ADM-17.08 was not followed in the examples listed below resulting in failure to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Rule.

1. The generic implications of the failure of a temperature control valve in the Turbine Cooling Water System, which caused a Unit 2 manual reactor trip on June 6, 1996, were not considered for similar valves in other plant systems.

2. Work Orders 95007753-01 and 95007984-01 referenced the preventive maintenance performed on the 4.16 KV Station Blackout Cross-tie Breakers, and the unavailability of these breakers was not trended against the unavailability performance criteria in the licensee's Maintenance Rule Quarterly Report dated July 9, 1996.

   Work Orders 95021809-01 and 95023498-01 reported repetitive maintenance preventable functional failures for the 4.16 KV breakers for the pressurizer heater electrical supply which were not shown in the licensee's Maintenance Rule Quarterly Report dated July 9, 1996.

3. The Chemical and Volume Control System and Containment Spray System owners were not adequately monitoring their systems and components for compliance to performance criteria since the unavailability hours recorded did not include:

   - Five hours six minutes on July 10 when the 2A charging pump was out of service,
   - One hundred twenty nine hours 25 minutes between July 22nd and July 27th when the 1A charging pump was out of service,
   - Eighty hours thirteen minutes between July 13th and July 17th when the 2A charging pump was out of service,
   - Ten hours more than were recorded when the 2A charging pump was out of service between August 5th and August 8th,
   - Twelve hours fifty five minutes between August 6th and August 7th when the 2A hydrazine pump, a portion of a Containment Spray train, was out of service, and

- Seventeen hours twelve minutes on August 18th when the 2A hydrazine pump, a portion of a Containment Spray train, was out of service.

4. The system owner did not document the July 25, 1996, potential maintenance preventable functional failure of the 1A Boric Acid Makeup pump on a Condition Report.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I)

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Florida Power and Light Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without reduction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public.

Dated in Atlanta, Georgia
this day of October 1996